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Abstract: With the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a new era began in the 
recognition and guarantee of human rights in the international area. However, since the moment of its 
approval, this text has received negative evaluations designed to relegate it to the background. The 
responses to these criticisms allow us to review their political and legal scope, and put it in value as a 
reference model in the field of human rights, delving into the pending issues to strengthen it. This is 
intended, on the seventieth anniversary of the Declaration, to insist that this remains an essential bridge to 
clarify standards that can serve as a basis for discussion between different cultures and ideologies and, 
therefore, an instrument that each generation must "reappropriate". 
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Summary: I. A new era of rights; II. The difficult political consensus; III. The legal value of the 
Declaration today and its expansive effect; IV. A possible model of moral reference in the matter of 
human rights; V. Pending issues for the strengthening of the Declaration: a future with rights. 
 
I. A NEW ERA OF RIGHTS  
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted in New York 
on December 10th, 1948 by means of Resolution 217 (III) of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations. The UDHR was created marked by the profound effects of World 
War II, after which it was clear that the protection of human rights had to be an essential 
issue in the agenda of the new organization of the international system. The Charter of 
the United Nations (1945) included references to guarantee human rights, to contribute 
to social progress and improve standards of living. That is why it is not surprising that 
the Preamble of the Declaration indicates that "disregard and contempt for human rights 
have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind" so that 
the objective must be that this situation does not repeat itself. 
 
From the initial discussions, the Declaration was conceived as an aspiration, as a 
list of objectives to be achieved by the different States, in line with the Preamble "as a 
common standard of achievement for which all individuals and nations must strive" to 
promote "respect for these rights and freedoms" and ensure, "by progressive measures 
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of national and international, their universal and effective recognition and observance". 
Thus began a new era in the recognition and guarantee of human rights in the 
international area that, at this moment, cannot be considered finished. 
 
At the time of its adoption, the UDHR was a monumental event in international 
law, subsequently it has also influenced the different regional systems and national legal 
systems. Although it suffers from deficiencies, it cannot be denied that it was one of the 
first attempts on human rights to articulate the principles by which societies and States 
would be governed beyond the strict national sovereignty. In that sense, it is a symbol of 
the recognition in the international system that pure power was not to be the only 
consideration for determining how governance was pursued and that individuals and 
societies were deserving of respect and protection and that international law would take 
a direct interest in these matters (Burchill and Cavandoli, 2011, 50). It cannot be said 
that the UDHR has fulfilled all its expectations, although a good part of them, even 
taking into account that the international system for the promotion and protection of 
human rights that has evolved from the Declaration has not only had to compete with 
other priorities in the international system, but also with the always latent reluctance of 
the States to the intromissions in their sovereignty in the matter of rights and 
sensitivities of a cultural and ideological nature. 
 
After seventy years of validity of the Declaration, the latter has not been able to 
overcome two of its most common criticisms. The first consists on considering that this 
text suffers from a Westernist perspective, or worse imperialist, which is born marked 
by the will of the victors, as a unique valid model of behavior. Thus, it is emphasized 
that, at the time of its drafting, the importance of national and regional particularities 
was not taken into account, nor was there a special sensitivity in the recognition and 
respect of the different historical, cultural and religious patrimonies. In that sense it can 
be noted, as Santos (2004, 105) does, that there are Western or Western-liberal bias in 
the Declaration because it was drafted without the participation of the majority of the 
peoples of the world and prioritized civil and political rights, in such a way that it has 
been the discourse and practice of human rights of a counterhegemonic nature that have 
proposed non-Western conceptions of human rights, showing that the central task of an 
emancipatory policy in this field is to transform the conceptualization and practice of 
human rights from a globalized localism to a project of cosmopolitan nature. 
 
A careful, up-to-date and dynamic reading of the UDHR does not prevent, in my 
opinion, overcoming that Western perspective, if we focus on the basic aspects of the 
Declaration. In fact, the appreciation of a biased nature of this international text, which 
carries a certain risk of disparagement, has always been latent because, as Eleanor 
Roosevelt pointed out, the documents that express ideals do not impose any burden 
except to be known by the people, understood and "lived" (Glendon 2011, 30). 
 
To face this criticism, we must point out the ultimate foundation of the 
declaration, to its true teleological purpose: the dignity of the person, understood as an 
ascriptive concept, which prevents the treatment of human beings only as a means, in 
the line proposed from the Kantian categorical imperative. Thus, as we will see, the 
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Declaration is an instrument at the service of that concretion of the ideal of justice, 
which are human rights conceived from a broad transcultural consensus that is 
sometimes not very concrete, generic or even diffuse in the effort to bring together 
wills. 
 
The second criticism refers to the UDHR’s legal nature, to the extent that it is 
not a treaty, therefore it cannot be considered as a legally binding instrument by itself. It 
is also accused of being a mere rhetoric, even justifying speeches at the service of 
power, which has nothing to do with the reality of human rights. In that sense, attending 
to that common ideal to which appeals the Preamble, as has been indicated, there has 
been more insistence on its moral and political value than its juridical one, considering 
it, as maintained by Cassese (1991, 51), “a simple reciprocal and solemn promise that 
committed only in the ethical-political level, but did not involve legal obligations for the 
States”. However, since the creation of the Declaration, voices also accredited, such as 
Cassin's (1951, 293-294), argued that it constituted an authorized interpretation of the 
Charter of the United Nations and that it was intended to become part of the general 
principles of law, so that it could be considered as the reference term to appreciate to 
what extent the States complied with the obligation of cooperation with the United 
Nations in the field of human rights. The Charter established that the United Nations 
and the Member States would take measures for the promotion and protection of human 
rights, and, as will be analyzed, the Economic and Social Council was responsible for 
establishing a Commission to address the protection of human rights that was 
constituted in 1946 to draw up an International Bill of Rights, where the UDHR would 
be the cornerstone of this process. 
 
The great transformation that the Declaration has experienced since its approval 
and the possibility of carrying out a broad and up-to-date reading of the context in 
which it must be applied, makes it possible to affirm, as a good part of the doctrine 
holds, that it constitutes a powerful instrument and that it creates legal obligations for 
the Member States of the United Nations. 
 
The responses to these criticisms allow us not only to review the political and 
legal scope of the Declaration departing from its nature and binding character, but also 
to value it especially as a reference model in the field of human rights, delving into the 
pending issues to strengthen it. With this, it is intended to collect, on the seventieth 
anniversary of the UDHR, the invitation made by Eleanor Roosevelt to learn about this 
international instrument of reference, so that the Declaration would have greater 
strength. It is the right moment to insist on its importance, since, as Glendon (2011, 27 
and 30) maintains, the tension between the global homogenization of forces and a 
greater recognition of ethnic differences makes it necessary to clarify standards that can 
serve as a basis for the debate between different cultures and ideologies. To that end, the 
Declaration continues to be an essential bridge, because as an international instrument, 
it is a living and dynamic text that does not end in a single interpretation, it is linked to 
the context in which it is analyzed and it must be "reappropriated" in each generation. 
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II. THE DIFFICULT POLITICAL CONSENSUS 
 
The Charter of the United Nations, which was signed in 1945, can be considered 
the immediate antecedent to the UDHR’s adoption, although there are several legal 
instruments adopted before and after that contribute to explain its ethical, political and 
legal significance (Carrillo Salcedo, 2001, 57). The Declaration is influenced by what 
Cassese (1991, 31-35) calls “great texts of the past”, from the Cyrus Cylinder (539 BC), 
the Magna Carta (1215) or the General Privilege of Aragon (1283), to the English Bill 
of Rights (1689), the Virginia Declaration of Rights and the Declaration of 
Independence of the United States (both of 1766) and the French Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789), to delve into the idea of human dignity 
(Morsink, 2009). 
 
In accordance with the provisions of the Article 68 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, the Economic and Social Council created, on February 16th, 1946, the first 
Commission composed of nine persons individually. This Commission was chaired by 
Eleanor Roosevelt, which should be valued as an achievement with multiple 
interpretations, if taken into consideration, also at the historical moment, as she herself 
would remember, that she was the only woman in the delegation, which would make 
her feel that an error of hers would be interpreted as a mistake on the part of all women 
and would reduce the chances of work for them in the future. In fact, her own 
colleagues from the US delegation confessed that they did all that was possible for the 
president to keep her out of it (Glendon 2011, 69). 
 
This nuclear commission recommended the preparation of a draft declaration of 
rights and the designation of a larger and more plural group. Thus, by the Resolution 9 
(II) of June 21st, 1946, of the Economic and Social Council, it was decided that the 
Human Rights Commission should be composed of 18 state representatives, as a 
subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council (now replaced by the Human 
Rights Council, as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly). This option responded, 
to a large extent, to the reluctance on the part of some States in relation to the 
establishment of independent bodies with jurisdiction over human rights. As soon as the 
Commission began to work, the first difficulties arose, showing the sensitivity of the 
topics that were addressed, which were saved by expanding the group and creating a 
drafting committee that would take up the drafts and existing proposals and would be in 
charge of sending the project to the Commission (Pons Rafols, 1998, 33). 
 
The Commission assumed the articulation of a complex process, marked by the 
ideological and political conflict between different States, which proceeded in different 
stages and proposals, from the Commission’s first session to the presentation of the 
declaration to the plenary of the General Assembly. From the beginning, several 
difficulties were raised, among them, as the first question, the question of whether a 
non-binding declaration of rights would be drawn up, along the lines proposed by the 
United States and the Soviet Union, or a binding treaty for States as proposed by the 
United Kingdom, Belgium, Australia and the Philippines. Finally, it was decided to 
work on a triple objective and jointly draw up a declaration, a human rights treaty and a 
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series of measures for its implementation, although the most intense and fruitful work 
was carried out on the text of the Declaration (Del Toro Huerta, 2012, 50). 
 
Despite the problems that it had to face, the UDHR constituted a kind of balance 
and political consensus among the different positions that existed in the international 
community around the difficult issue of human rights. At the request of Poland, it was 
decided to vote separately on each paragraph of the Preamble and the different articles 
of the project. The second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh paragraphs of the 
"Preamble" and articles 3 to 12, 14 to 17, 20 to 25, 27, 29 and 30 were adopted 
unanimously, while the final vote on the whole of the Declaration obtained 48 votes in 
favor, none against, and eight abstentions (Saudi Arabia, Belarus, Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Yugoslavia, Ukraine, Soviet Union and South African Union), with the absence 
of two of the state representatives (Honduras and Yemen) in the moment of the vote. 
The abstention of Saudi Arabia is considered especially significant because it expresses 
the reservations to the Declaration dictated by the Muslim cultural tradition in matters 
of religion and family life that have continued to be maintained. In any case, those who 
opposed the approval of the Declaration opted to abstain without tarnishing a large 
majority that did not receive direct opposition (Pons Rafols, 1998, 40-41). 
 
The reasons why States abstained from voting were diverse. In the case of the 
South African Union, it refused to include social rights and limited the scope of non-
discrimination principle in defense of the apartheid system; Saudi Arabia, opposed to 
recognize religious freedom and equality between men and women, regarding the right 
to marriage; and the Soviet bloc, composed of Belarus, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Yugoslavia, Ukraine and the Soviet Union, opposed ideological questions to the 
incorporation of certain rights, in accordance with the principle of non-intervention, for 
not taking into account the sovereign rights of the States, the principle of self-
determination of peoples and the duties of the individual before the State, highlighting 
the lack of mechanisms to implement the rights recognized in the Declaration (Morsink, 
1999, 21-28). 
 
Out of the eight abstentions, today seven can be considered widely surpassed 
after the end of the Cold War in 1989, which facilitated the adhesion of the States 
belonging to the at the time socialist bloc to the values represented in it and the end of 
the apartheid regime in Southern Africa (Villán Durán, 2018, 114). 
 
As Glendon (2011, 28-29) recalls, the texts proclaiming that all human beings 
are born free and equal and that governments are responsible for protecting these 
freedoms, elaborated the modern language of law that was basically branched into two 
discourses: the European and the Anglo-American. The first, under the influence of 
authors such as Rousseau, was oriented towards freedom and fraternity, considering the 
State as the guarantor of rights and leveling the latter with duties. In the second, the 
Anglo-American language on law focused on freedom and individual initiative, with a 
marked distrust towards the government. When the Latin American countries became 
independent in the 19th century, these perspectives were mixed. In addition, states such 
as the Soviet Union adopted a different perspective prioritizing equality over freedom. 
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These different approaches had to be synthesized to make it possible for a Declaration 
with the pretension of being "universal". For this purpose, it was based on such basic 
principles that no State dared to openly discredit them, which implies a strength and at 
the same time a weakness of the Declaration that did not prevent it from displacing the 
documents that preceded it to become the main model of the current legal instruments. 
 
The Declaration establishes the bases for the protection of human rights and is 
structured, in the words of Cassin (1951, 267), in what he calls the "four columns" and 
the facade, which make up the "portico" of the Declaration. The first column is formed 
by the rights and freedoms of personal order (articles 3 to 11); the second, by the rights 
of the individual in relation to the groups of which he is a part (articles 12 to 17); the 
third is constituted by political rights (articles 18-21); and the last refers to economic, 
social and cultural rights (articles 22 to 27). On these four columns there is a 
frontispiece, the articles 28 to 30, which indicate the links between the individual and 
the society of which they are a part. 
 
After the Declaration’s adoption, the General Assembly recommended that the 
States published the text and arranged for it to be distributed and exposed to make it 
known. Until the approval of the International Covenants on Human Rights of 1966 
(International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ICCPR and International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ICESCR), the UDHR was the only 
document of international reference to face the challenges in the area of human rights. 
Subsequently, international human rights law was developed, consolidating this process 
started with the Declaration that can be considered as humanization and 
internationalization of international law, affecting those that can be considered as the 
three aspects of international protection of the rights of human beings: human rights, 
humanitarian law and refugee law (Cançado Trindade, Peytrignet and Ruiz de Santiago, 
2003). 
 
The first step that the Declaration took has been completed with a thematic 
specialization supported by the Human Rights Commission, the Economic and Social 
Council and the General Assembly, and by proposals at the regional level and also 
coming from other international organizations such as the ILO or the UNESCO. This 
specialization process has tried to address specific situations or respond to certain 
groups, following the guidelines of the UDHR and the international human rights pacts, 
beginning with a text that generally includes certain rights and subsequently a treaty 
with a binding nature for the States Parties, with monitoring and implementation 
mechanisms (Del Toro Huerta, 2012, 56). 
 
The reticence of a political nature that had already been revealed at the time of 
the vote on the Declaration, linked to religious issues, has persisted. Thus, the States of 
the Organization of the Islamic Conference (later called the Organization for Islamic 
Cooperation) adopted the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, on August 5th, 
1990. In 1997, this group of States maintained that the recognition and total respect for 
the world's main legal systems, including Islamic jurisprudence, is essential for the 
promotion of universality postulated by the UDHR; it advocated the codification of the 
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Islamic norms and principles included in the Cairo Declaration in a universally 
recognized Islamic human rights instrument and promoted the adoption of common 
positions in international human rights forums, in defense of the values embodied by the 
Islamic sharia (Villan Durán, 1998, 80). In the subsequent summits of the Organization 
for Islamic Cooperation, as the one held in 2016 (Istanbul) and the one announced for 
2019, the question of the protection and guarantee of rights is directly related to issues 
such as security and terrorism. 
 
It has never been easy to reconcile the universality of human rights that the 
Declaration proclaims with the aspects that are presented as difficult cultural 
particularisms, which question the general standards of protection, that is precisely the 
limit for the acceptance of these specialties. Precisely in the establishment of given 
limits that respect the principles established in the UDHR in the international scope can 
be appreciated, as well, the level of democratic institutions, since, as Beetham (1999, 
24) states “it is only by grasping the underlying principles involved that we are able to 
assess how far a given institution is democratic in practice, and what else might be 
required to make it so”. 
 
The high level of politicization, to which the Declaration was submitted, 
continues to be present in many aspects related to the recognition, guarantee and 
protection of human rights. As Villán Durán (2018, 115) points out, that strong political 
tendency and the absolute majority of the African and Asian States within the Human 
Rights Council (with a total of 26 votes out of 47), can make us fear for the future of the 
valuable special procedures system. In this regard, the Council is increasingly hostile to 
geographical mandates. States interested in the study of the situation of human rights in 
a country in difficulty prefer it to be carried out by the High Commissioner because it is 
not an independent expert, but a senior official of the Organization, or simply that no 
such investigation is carried out. 
 
Certainly, it is possible that the political and moral importance of the Declaration 
from the outset would even surpass its specific legal significance. As Von Bernstorff 
(2008) recalls, in the 1980s, the Declaration embodied the hope for a new era of human 
rights protection after the end of the Cold War, while during the 1990s a new defense of 
the Declaration’s universal character was observed, also examining its institutional 
limitations. In general, the UDHR can be considered as a synonym for the importance 
of individual rights in international law, in such a way that, faced with a sense of crisis 
due to institutional blockages, it receives, again, an increasing attention. Indeed, the 
Declaration can be seen as symbolizing unity in an increasingly fragmented and 
controversial institutional and political environment for the international protection of 
human rights. 
 
In addition, the human rights recognized by the Declaration can be seen from the 
perspective of Habermas (2010, 118) as a "realistic utopia" to the extent that they 
cement the ideal objective of a just society in the constitutional states, yet they introduce 
certain tension. Thus, the human rights policy of the United Nations shows the 
contradiction between the expansion of the rhetoric of human rights and its abuse as an 
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instrument of legitimation for the usual politics of power. This is why it is essential to 
insist on the role that the United Nations’ system must play, through the progressive 
international codification in so far as it allows, to specify the obligations of the States 
themselves, and also as a way of measuring the progress made by the States themselves 
within the field of human rights. 
 
This political dimension is undoubtedly essential in the field of human rights, as 
has already been noted in the studies prior to the approval of the UDHR. In this sense, 
authors such as Baynes (2009, 7) insist on their eminently political conception because 
they are conceived as rights within the political community, affirming “according to 
some theorists, human rights are to be viewed as part of a ‘realistic utopia’, according 
to others as constraints obligating any coercive social institution, and others still as 
basic conditions for membership in any political society. I refer to each of these 
approaches as political”, which, in my opinion, is not exclusive, but rather 
complementary of its legal and moral dimension. 
 
III. THE LEGAL VALUE OF THE DECLARATION TODAY AND ITS EXPANSIVE 
EFFECT 
 
The repeated discussion about the Declaration’s legal value stems from its nature 
and its questioning binding character. Regarding its nature, the fact that it is a resolution 
does not necessarily mean that it does not currently have a binding value. Indeed, in the 
practice of the United Nations "a declaration is a formal and solemn instrument that is 
used in very special cases, in matters of great and real importance and when maximum 
observance is expected from the largest number of States possible (...) principles are 
formulated that are of great importance and lasting value, as in the case of the 
Declaration of Human Rights" (Memorandum of the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN 
Secretariat, Doc. E / CN. 4 / L.610). 
 
Already in the early years of the Declaration, Lauterpacht (1950: 150) noted that 
“it would be contrary both to these requirements (of good faith and of decency) and to 
the principle of effectiveness if the repeated and solemn provisions of the Charter in the 
matter of human rights and fundamental freedoms, coupled with the clear legal 
obligation to promote respect for them by joint and separate action, were interpreted as 
devoid of the obligation to respect them”. 
 
It is true that the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations do not have a strong legislative character a priori, which means that they are 
not adopted as binding instruments and, in that sense, they lack binding force. However, 
this does not mean that it does not have legal effects linked to its material importance, 
its evolutionary interpretation, its progressive development, and the reference to 
programmatic principles that end up becoming a reference of the evolution of general 
international law in such a way that crosses the field of soft law to reach hard law. 
 
In general, the legal value of a Declaration is conditioned by the intention to 
enunciate legal principles, the majority by which it has been adopted, its content, and 
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the subsequent practice of the States. The UDHR has, initially since its adoption, two 
legal effects linked to the duties established in the Charter of the United Nations in the 
field of human rights. On the one hand, the formation of a principle of international law 
consisting of the general obligation of States to respect and protect the human rights of 
individuals subject to their jurisdiction; and on the other hand, the restriction of state 
sovereignty in accordance with the principle of respect and protection of such rights 
(Carrillo Salcedo, 2001, 57). 
 
The legal value of the Declaration can be explained with three theories (Oraá, 
1999, 185) that are not necessarily mutually exclusive. A first theory holds that the 
UDHR can be considered as an authorized and authentic interpretation of the Charter of 
the United Nations in the field of human rights. This interpretation is reinforced by the 
fact that the various organs of the United Nations constantly appeal to it when they 
apply the clauses of the Charter, for example, the General Assembly in several of its 
resolutions, the Commission on Human Rights and the Subcommittee, and the special 
rapporteurs, among others. In reference to the Declaration, in the key of authority and 
referent, the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice of The Hague is also 
situated (from famous cases such as Barcelona Traction). 
 
From a second perspective, it can be considered that States have incorporated 
many of the clauses of the UDHR in their domestic legislation and cite it in a 
continuous manner. This has generated a rule of customary law that does not affect all 
articles, but a significant part of them. It could even be considered as a rule of ius 
cogens or peremptory norm of general international law (Lepard, 2010, 318) according 
to what is established in article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
According to what is established in said precept, it could be considered as "a norm 
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm 
that does not admit agreement to the contrary and that can only be modified by a 
subsequent norm of general international law that has the same character". 
 
In the relation between treaties and custom, applied to the Declarations of the 
General Assembly proposed by Jiménez de Aréchaga (1980, 19-42), three types of 
effects can be distinguished: the codifier, insofar as the Declaration could be considered 
as the compilation of pre-existing standards; the crystallizer, so that the Declaration 
would collect in writing a custom that was being formed and, in doing so, it would be 
crystallized into a customary norm; and, finally, the generator, which would allow the 
Declaration to be considered as a new norm that constitutes the starting point of a 
subsequent practice of the States, making it become a rule of customary law. 
 
As maintains a part of the doctrine (Oraá, 1999, 188 and Del Toro Huerta, 2012, 
71) it is appropriate to consider that, rather than having an encoder or crystallizer pre-
existing rights effect or being in statu nascendi (since the Charter does not contain any 
list of rights), the Declaration can be conceived as a document generating legal norms of 
lege ferenda. In this sense, since it is the first international document of universal and 
general character on human rights, it is sought that it undoubtedly contributes to its 
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internationalization, since, up to now, said matter belonged to the States’ internal 
jurisdiction. 
 
The subsequent practices of both the States and the organs of the international 
community in relation to the Declaration meet the requirements so that it can be 
considered as a customary norm, insofar as both the material or objective element 
regarding the subsequent practice, repeated, constant and uniform, as the formal or 
subjective element as regards opinio iuris. In this sense, by placing the Charter and the 
Declaration on the same level, the conviction of the States regarding the mandatory 
nature of this is evident. To this is added the fact that many of the countries have 
directly or indirectly taken the Declaration as a model or reference in their constitutions 
(especially in the countries that achieved their independence after the 1950s), laws and 
policies in defense of the human rights. Likewise, the different final documents of 
relevant conferences, such as the Proclamation of Tehran (final act of the International 
Conference on Human Rights, Tehran April 22 to May 13, 1968, Document NCONF.32 
/ 11) and the Vienna Declaration (World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna on 
June 25, 1993, Document A/CONF.157/24), among others, insist on adhering to and 
acting in accordance with the Charter and the Declaration. 
 
A third possibility would be to consider the Declaration as general principles of 
law in such a way that they would be considered as a source of international law 
according to article 38.1.c of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which 
would not allow its normative character to be questioned, along the lines that was 
already noted that were held, for example, by Cassin. 
 
Whichever interpretation is chosen, all of them lead to highlight the general 
consensus on the part of States about the mandatory nature of the UDHR. There is, 
however, an open debate that not all articles of the Declaration are equally binding for 
all States, as a consequence of the general acceptance of the Declaration. This debate 
connects with the differentiation established in the Pacts of 1966 and the positions that 
consider that the obligations that generate, on the one hand, civil and political rights, 
and economic, social and cultural rights on the other, are different, instead of 
understanding that human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent. Alston 
(1990, 1) affirms that the Declaration has a "revolutionary content", precisely because it 
includes economic and social rights as part of the basic rights, considering them 
indivisible to the rest of human rights, therefore setting an important precedent. 
 
The two international conferences on human rights already mentioned insisted 
on relevant issues, such as the nature and normative scope of the Universal Declaration, 
with special mention to the interdependence of rights as well as their universality. 
Indeed, in the first of them, the Proclamation of Teheran was approved, and in its 
second paragraph it was affirmed that the UDHR "states a common understanding of the 
peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of 
the human family and constitutes an obligation for the members of the international 
community". In the same line, in the second conference the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action were approved, which emphasizes in its fifth paragraph that "all 
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human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated". This 
reaffirms the questionable indivisibility between political, civil, cultural, economic and 
social human rights, considering them as a set that must be promoted and protected. 
Both conferences served to reaffirm the ideas of universality, indivisibility and 
interdependence of human rights that have been subsequently confirmed in multiple 
international provisions. However, until 2008, the General Assembly did not transfer 
the Vienna Declaration to positive law through the adoption of the Optional Protocol to 
the ICESCR. 
 
As Villán Durán (2018, 116) recalls, said Protocol constituted a historic 
milestone in the real equation of all human rights, since it recognized the justiciability 
of economic, social and cultural rights at the international level, by enabling the DESC 
Committee to receive individual complaints for alleged violations of any of the rights 
enshrined in ICESCR. The ratification of the Protocol as affirmed by Añón (2010, 41) 
can be interpreted as a way to assume, on the part of the legislator, new obligations in 
relation to social rights and a gesture of recognition of their relevance as human rights. 
In the words of the aforementioned author "it is a feasible legal perspective that 
involves recomposing the principles of the social and democratic State of law and the 
institutional role of legal operators linked in their daily activities to the purposes of this 
model of State". 
 
The Declaration, therefore, has been a decisive text for the guarantee of human 
rights insofar as it was elaborated through a negotiation that implies a broad, although 
not unanimous, consensus on the fundamental nature of its content and has allowed the 
promotion of instruments later, strengthening its binding dimension. However, the 
pending issue of human rights today is not so much to proclaim them as it is to protect 
them, since it is obvious that the more respected the Declaration, the greater its degree 
of effectiveness and legal influence. In any case, among the objectives of the 
Declaration, both in its origins and that persist today, there is not only the intention to 
create instruments of jurisdictional protection, but rather the will to express those rights 
inherent to the dignity of the person, since, as will be analyzed below, it also serves as a 
standard and valuation fee. 
 
Beyond the legal instruments, and the development thereof, which have emerged 
from the basis of the Declaration, the latter has an expansive effect that has to do with 
the different programs that are developed from the United Nations and with the creation 
of a jurisdictional mechanism. Both initiatives connect with the Article 28 of the 
Declaration when it states that "everyone is entitled to a social and international order in 
which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration cannot be fully realized". 
 
With regard to the first issue, both the Charter of the United Nations and the 
Declaration, as noted, have already shown the importance of the promotion and 
internationalization of human rights. This has also been transferred to the strategies of 
cooperation and international development as an indispensable estimation for the 
construction of peace at a global level. 
THE POLITICAL, LEGAL AND MORAL SCOPE  
OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: PENDING ISSUES 
The Age of Human Rights Journal, 11 (December 2018) pp. 1-23  ISSN: 2340-9592  DOI: 10.17561/tahrj.n11.1    12 
 
 On the basis of the aforementioned Article 28, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations proclaimed in 1986 the right to development as an "inalienable human 
right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate 
in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in 
which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized" (Declaration on 
the right to development, resolution 41/128, of December 4, 1986). Thereon, within the 
United Nations Development Programme, different initiatives have been finalized. As 
Verdiales López (2018, 77) recalls, with the creation of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), the possibility of incorporating human rights into each of their strategies 
was contemplated, even though it was not really achieved that human rights would have 
a relevant role in the development of said Objectives. The redefinition and expansion of 
these is proposed through the Sustainable Development Goals, which insist on the 
importance of the central role of human rights to ensure respect for human dignity and 
international justice. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the basis of the 
Objectives, departs from the "leaving no one behind" claim and reaffirms the 
importance of human rights and the responsibility of States to respect, protect and 
promote human rights and fundamental freedoms of all people without any distinction, 
in accordance with the Charter. 
 
In the same line as article 28 in relation to the full effectiveness of rights, the 
international legal order includes specific conventional instruments related to the 
protection of rights and binding for States parties, among them the Statute of Rome 
(1998) which established the International Criminal Court. As Herrera Carbuccia (2018, 
542-546) points out, the legal value of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
international standards on human rights has been and continues to be essential in terms 
of the administration of justice. It is fundamental to point out the role of the 
International Criminal Court in the application and interpretation of international human 
rights norms and resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations. 
The Court is the first permanent international criminal court with jurisdiction over the 
most serious crimes related to the international community. It is a reminder for the 
States to prevent and stop armed conflicts, contributing to the prevention of 
international crimes, to international peace and to the protection of the fundamental 
values of human dignity and life. As stated in the preamble to the Rome Statute, today 
more than ever, the recognition and effective protection of the rights enunciated in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights are of vital importance in international law, to 
guarantee respect for due process and an independent and impartial administration of 
justice that allows creating a world in peace, security and well-being. 
 
 
IV. A POSSIBLE MODEL OF MORAL REFERENCE IN THE MATTER OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
 
As has been stated, the Declaration is the symbolically most relevant instrument 
in the world on human rights. Given its universal vocation and its innovative nature at 
the time it was drafted, it constitutes a symbol of a protest against infamy, barbarism 
and any form of collective or individual dehumanization. The Declaration also 
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symbolizes a proclamation in favor of each person’s dignity, a tool to stimulate the 
conscience of humanity, motivate protest and social resistance, within the very limits, 
principles and values that define human rights (Del Toro Huerta, 97-98). 
 
Moreover, the Declaration incorporated, within the very idea of universality, the 
existence of a heritage and common interest of humanity. As Cançado Trindade points 
out (2010, 349), conceptions of the common heritage and of common interest of 
humanity embody the universal solidarity and social responsibility that emanate from 
human consciousness (not the will of States), and reflect basic values of the 
international community in a way that allow it to be strengthened in the face of a 
fragmented vision. Thus, it is possible “to face the new global challenges to the 
international community as a whole, and indeed to all humankind, and to provide 
adequate and satisfactory responses to them, which the systems of positive law by 
themselves simply cannot do”. 
 
The main features of human rights that, as has been pointed out, are identified in 
the Universal Declaration, such as universality, interdependence and indivisibility, 
make it a living and symbolically relevant instrument, but its fundamental moral scope 
lies in the idea of human dignity; these traits emerge from it. 
 
In the first place, as regards the idea of dignity, it is present in both the Charter 
and the Declaration. Dignity is mentioned at the beginning of the UN Charter: “we the 
peoples of the United Nations determined to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, 
in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and 
of nations large and small...”. The article 1 of the Declaration provides: “all human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”. In other human rights instruments, 
as are the aforementioned 1966 Pacts, the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the word “dignity” is connected with 
equality and the idea that human dignity, which belongs to everyone equally, is the 
source of all rights. 
 
As Habermas (2010, 108 and 111) rightly states, human dignity is not a 
qualifying term adopted by the Declaration, but the moral source from which the 
contents of all rights are nourished. From the very beginning, there has existed, albeit 
implicitly, a close conceptual relationship between both notions. This author is right 
when he highlights the catalytic role played by the concept of dignity in the composition 
of human rights based on rational morality and in the form of subjective rights. In my 
opinion, Habermas' reference to the notion of human dignity is fully evidenced in the 
Declaration, thus affirming that human dignity allows the equal universal content of 
morality to be imported into the right, is, therefore, the conceptual hinge that relates the 
moral of equal respect to each subject and the positive democratic right. 
 
Dignity with this moral basis has also played a fundamental political role. Since 
the adoption of the Declaration itself, as McCrudden (2008, 722-724) points out, this 
concept has allowed different cultures, with very different conceptions of the State, 
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different points of view on the foundation of human rights and diverse ethical and moral 
perspectives have overcome their ideological differences, focusing on the specific. In 
that sense, he maintains, however, that "everyone could agree that human dignity was 
central, but not why or how". The concept of dignity can be questioned from different 
interpretations, but if we look at it as the moral foundation on which the UDHR is 
based, we should refer to a basic minimum content of the meaning of human dignity. In 
the words of said author: "a basic minimum content of the meaning of human dignity 
can be discerned: that each human being possesses an intrinsic worth that should be 
respected, that some forms of conduct are inconsistent with respect for this intrinsic 
worth, and that the state exists for the individual not vice versa. The fault lines lie in 
disagreement on what that intrinsic worth consists in, what forms of treatment are 
inconsistent with that worth, and what the implications are for the role of the state". 
 
Certainly, there was no need for a more specific common theory, which would 
exceed that minimum basic content, for the political acceptance of the Charter and the 
Declaration, not even for the acceptance of subsequent texts on human rights at the 
international, regional and national levels. Moreover, as was seen when analyzing the 
political-historical framework in which the Declaration emerged, possibly the attempt to 
generate a greater consensus could have produced counterproductive results. That 
minimum character, as McCrudden points out, does not facilitate judicial interpretation 
of the specific rights that were promulgated, but facilitates substantive meanings, 
namely, "providing a language in which judges can appear to justify how they deal with 
issues such as the weight of rights, the domestication and contextualization of rights, 
and the generation of new or more extensive rights". It is precisely in the development 
of this function that the UDHR and the set of human rights texts that have developed it 
can have a relevance in the judicial field that is conjugated with the role that it played at 
the time of approval in the philosophical, political and legal debate. 
 
As Carozza (2008, 937) also recognizes, the different articles of the Declaration 
do not provide the specificity necessary to make difficult decisions about how to 
balance, let's say the rights to which it refers, in such a way that, in any case, the 
requirement to specify the content of human dignity does not eliminate the need for a 
judicial interpretation that goes beyond the minimum core of the concepts. As correctly, 
in my opinion, this author recalls, and in the face of the criticism raised by McCrudden, 
even if there was no international agreement on some aspect of the minimum 
requirements of human dignity, there may be good reasons to affirm its validity, the 
same way that the mere existence of an international consensus on human dignity, per 
se, is not enough. From my point of view, the essential question to admit that human 
dignity is that moral source on which rights are nurtured and in that sense the 
foundation of the Declaration, is to take into consideration that the idea of dignity 
makes reference, as both authors recognize, to "the ontological claim that each human 
being has inherent worth as an individual person" in such a way that, on a moral plane, 
dignity exists independently of a consensus on its meaning and its content. 
 
Regarding the second relevant issue about the moral dimension of the 
Declaration, the debate on the scope and the claim of human rights’ universality in it 
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was already put into question at the time of its drafting and marked some of the 
abstentions as has been pointed. Today, the universality of human rights continues to be 
questioned from the ideological and cultural dimensions that stress its implementation, 
making its full validity difficult, either due to restrictions imposed under the protection 
of some cultural relativisms or because of false universalisms. The debate between 
relativism and universalism is very broad and can be used to question several rights. In 
summary, it can be located at three different levels (Del Toro Huerta, 2012, 100): from 
the interstate perspective (for example, the positions of some Islamic governments 
against Western governments); the intrastate (with respect to the claims of minority 
groups or indigenous or tribal peoples within the state sphere), or the intrasocietal (from 
the perspective of gender, or the demands of the community of transgender, lesbian, gay 
and bisexual people who question conceptions within of the same culture or society). 
This debate is interesting as Benhabib (2011, 57-77) masterfully exposes different types 
of universalism: essentialist universalism, justificatory universalism, moral 
universalism, and juridical universalism, to be able to bet on a cosmopolitan project that 
allows to go beyond the current philosophical universalism. 
 
Universality as a feature of the concept of human rights, along the lines 
proposed by the Declaration, implies both universality in the holders of the rights and in 
the subjects bound by them. This is a direct consequence of the Kantian requirement of 
the moral imperatives’ universality, but one that transcends this scope with positivity, 
internationalization and the specification of rights. 
 
In this sense, it is important to remember, as pointed out by Peces-Barba (1994, 
614-615) that the universality of rights can be approached from three perspectives: 
logical, temporal and spatial. In the first case, reference is made to "an ownership of the 
rights that are ascribed to all human beings. Its features are rationality and abstraction, 
congruent with that ownership of all men", in a current language, of all people. 
Temporal universality would imply that rights "have a rational and abstract character 
regardless of time and valid for any moment in history". Finally, the spatial field refers 
to "the extension of the culture of human rights to all political societies without 
exception". 
 
It is precisely this first meaning of universality that allows us to situate ourselves 
in the realm of morality. As Ansuátegui (1999, 214-215) maintains, in this dimension, 
the strong symbolic burden of the Declaration could be contrasted and it would acquire 
a special meaning, the very Declaration and the universality of the rights that it 
consecrates, provided that it is understood that this universality refers to the framework 
of moral discourse, as what, in my opinion, can be considered a moral reference that 
influences other international documents, previously mentioned. On the other hand, in 
relation to the Law, said universality would be a tendency, understood as an aspiration. 
Therefore, the universality of human rights is not a matter of fact, but a claim referring 
to the "universalizable" nature of rights, or, the same way: the aspiration to formulate 
them in such a way that they are susceptible to acceptance which, in turn, can be 
admitted as universal. We situate ourselves, therefore, within the framework of a 
prescriptive and non-descriptive discourse in relation to the universality of rights. 
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Universality would be a point of arrival, a goal to reach. This approach is fully 
compatible with what was expressly stated in the preamble of the Declaration and with 
its spirit, being consistent with the initial efforts to obtain its approval. 
 
In addition, it is important to keep the role of human dignity in mind, regarding 
the change of perspective from moral duties to legal rights and also in the promotion of 
that trending universality. As Habermas (2010, 113) points out, the modern theories of 
rational morality and rational law rest on the fundamental concept of the individual 
autonomy and on the principle of equal respect for all. This common base is 
fundamental but it cannot be forgotten that, while morality imposes duties that cover all 
spheres of action, modern law creates spaces of freedom for private arbitration and the 
development of individual life, not duties but subjective rights, the ones that form the 
basis for the construction of the legal system. In the Declaration both approaches find 
their place. 
 
On the other hand, the universality proposed by the UDHR regarding human 
rights is neither homogenization nor globalization. In the first place, it is not 
homogenization because it cannot be conceived as the imposition of a majority culture 
or the lack of respect for minorities, it cannot be the expression of the rule of the 
majority that can be imposed by the tyranny of the majority. It is in this sense that it can 
be affirmed that the democratic system has, as its basic premise, respect for human 
dignity and, along with it, the universality of rights. That is why the UDHR is 
considered a revolutionary instrument within the framework of international law to the 
extent that it represents a first effort to restrict the action of governments to promote and 
protect human rights over state interests. In the same vein, an international law of 
democracy in the post-Cold War period has been developed that has also determined the 
nature of international law and relations. In both cases, the objective is none other than 
"to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom, ideas and 
practices that are central to the appropriate understanding of democracy" (Burchill and 
Cavandoli, 2011, 46). 
 
In addition, universality, as conceived by the Declaration, is not compatible with 
globalization. As De Lucas (2008, 57) rightly explains, the hegemony of financial 
globalization and the absence of control favor the nexus between globalization and 
social exclusion, which is the negative result of globalization for most of the human 
beings that do not belong to the reduced group of process agents, of those integrated in 
globalization. Moving forward in legal and political globalization is, therefore, a 
necessity if we want to avoid the most devastating effects of the neoliberal ideology 
professed by the dogma of deregulation. Faced with the exclusive financial 
globalization, incompatible with universality, a globalization that demands progress 
towards the ideal of cosmopolitan democracy is urgent; and at the same time a legal 
globalization, in particular, of justice and human rights. 
 
From this other conception of globalization, still conceived as an ideal, the 
Declaration can continue to be the engine to invigorate the universalization of human 
rights and to reinforce them. 
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V. PENDING ISSUES FOR THE STRENGHTENING OF THE DECLARATION: A 
FUTURE WITH RIGHTS 
 
The UDHR, in addition to supposing a radical turn for the conception and 
evolution of the human rights at international level, today continues being just as 
significant, or more, politically, legally and morally than when it was approved, even 
though with all the efforts made also by the instruments that make up international 
human rights law, there are still violations. Securing and guaranteeing rights continues 
to be a work in progress in the three dimensions analyzed. 
 
 From the political point of view, just like at the time of the Declaration, the role 
of the States in the international and national dimension, ad intra and ad extra, remains 
essential, even more so with the impact of globalization. As Brown (2016, 72-73) 
recalls, the States have assumed their role as guarantors of the rights of everyone: civil, 
political, social, economic and cultural, fulfilling their obligations. The special position 
of the countries is not only a matter of effectiveness and control, but also a form of 
legitimacy that distinguishes them from other entities and agencies. The UDHR and the 
conventions aim to impose conditions based on human rights to this legitimacy, in this 
sense the human rights regime initiated by the UDHR was conceived as a basis, not 
only for subsequent international conventions and agreements, but also for legal 
systems of the States Parties. In a globalized world, in addition, States must commit 
themselves internationally to respect and guarantee the human rights of people in and 
beyond their borders, for several reasons: the effect of the state’s own policies and 
actions on other countries; the impact on other countries of the way in which it 
participates in international institutions; provision and efficacy of development aid; and 
the response to rights abuses in other countries, either by criticism and public 
denunciation or, as a last resort, by intervention and support for intervention. 
 
Insisting on the relevance of the state dimension, within the international 
community, in continuing the path initiated with the UDHR and the subsequent 
instruments means claiming the need for policies for the implementation of human 
rights and the incorporation of the human rights approach in those. In addition, it also 
means fighting decisively against one of the phenomena that most contributes to 
expanding the fierce reality of human rights violations: impunity. That fight against 
impunity is also a commitment to democracy and respect for the person’s dignity, that 
idea that we saw, which is at the base of the UDHR and human rights. The words of 
Cassese (1991, 150), when he said that “democracy means respect for the dignity of the 
person; Torture means humiliation or annihilation of that dignity. For this reason, 
torture nests in all non-liberal states or in the authoritarian retreats of democratic state 
structures”, are still relevant. 
 
Beetham (1999, 89) is right when he argues that if we adopt a holistic vision of 
the UDHR, as has been proposed in this paper, it is possible to construct the parameters 
of democracy and establish objectives for governance systems and governance. Civil 
and political rights are an integral part of the basic functioning of a democratic system 
and social and economic rights are crucial for the effective exercise of democracy. Since 
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the UDHR covers rights and indicators for democratic governance, it provides a solid 
foundation for the international law's definition of democracy. 
 
In the legal dimension, since the drafting of the UDHR there has been an 
imbalance in the treatment of different rights, initially giving priority to the 
development and mechanisms of international control of civil and political rights. In the 
rights included in this group there are still human rights violations that have to be 
persecuted, but there are also rights that, from the moment of the Declaration, were 
recognized in a deficient manner. In that sense, freedom of movement and the right to 
asylum are two good examples of rights recognized in the Declaration in an insufficient 
manner. Thus, the Article 13 UDHR does not recognize the right of entry, nor the 
individual or collective immigration, just as the Article 14 UDHR does not attribute to 
the person being persecuted the right to obtain asylum in another State other than that of 
their nationality, but simply to look for it and enjoy it. This meager recognition is 
largely due to the number of rights related to freedom of movement and asylum, among 
others, the principle of non-discrimination or the right to a nationality. In addition, as 
was already evident at the time of drafting the Declaration, the concretion of these 
precepts directly affects the exercise of the sovereignty of States, mainly if such 
sovereignty is conceived as absolute. Therefore, in the conventional framework, and, in 
particular, at the national level, immigration and immigration legislation limit the right 
to free movement and residence for reasons such as national security, general interest, 
public order, health or public morals and even the situation of the labor market. 
 
In the same vein, the right of asylum, although basically developed in the 
Convention on the Status of Refugees (Geneva, 1951) and its Protocol (New York, 
1967), refers to a refugee concept in need of revision in order to respond to current 
needs. In addition, within the asylum, the basic principle of non-refoulement, is 
questioned before the difficulties at the time of specifying aspects as basic as the notion 
of a safe third country. With all this, there is insistence on the error of not recognizing 
the deep political dimension of this reality, denying rights (De Lucas, 2017, 65). 
 
As regards economic, social and cultural rights, as has already been discussed, 
those were relegated to the background until the Vienna Declaration and the Protocol to 
the ICESCR. This Protocol recognized, as we pointed out, the international justiciability 
of the ESCR, the next step to strengthen the recognition and protection of these rights is 
to encourage the ratification of the Protocol; the fact that it is still very low (23 States in 
2018) evidences that there is still, as in the moment of approval of the UDHR, a great 
reticence on the part of the States in the real comparison of both types of rights. 
 
Other rights, such as resistance against oppression, were not accepted for 
inclusion in the drafting process of the UDHR, as proposed by some delegations, 
including Cuba, Chile, France, and the Soviet Union (Morsink, 307-312). The final 
report of UNESCO, derived from the consultations carried out during the drafting 
process of the Declaration, referred to the "right to rebellion and revolution", which 
does not appear in the final text either, when the Government would not comply with 
the fundamental principles of justice and would not respect fundamental rights "in such 
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a way that could not correct such abuses by peaceful means", before which there would 
be the right to establish "a government that is more in conformity with justice and 
humanity". However, an integrated reading of the whole of the UDHR articles allows us 
to include this idea and maintain from the Preamble that it is "essential that human 
rights are protected by the rule of law", so that people do not feel compelled "to have 
recourse to rebellion against tyranny and oppression" taking into account that, according 
to the Article 29.3 of the Declaration, rights and freedoms may not be exercised in 
opposition to the purposes and principles of the United Nations (Del Toro 2012, 98). 
 
Also, the limitation established by the Article 30 is important in order to 
establish the parameters of a democratic society. This final clause protects the rights 
established in the Declaration against possible attacks that may come from the State, 
groups of people or individuals (Burchill and Cavandoli, 2011, 58).  
 
In the line of impulse to the rights recognized by the UDHR, Villán Durán 
(2018, 116-117) is correct when he points out that a current reading of the Declaration, 
with projection in the international community of the 21st century, also demands the 
aforementioned development of the Article 28, to claim what it calls the human rights of 
solidarity or "synthesis", departing from the essential interdependence of human rights. 
From this perspective, it is possible to promote the right to peace, the economic and 
social development of the people or the right to the environment. These last claims of 
rights not expressly contemplated in the UDHR (which makes sense considering the 
historical moment in which it was drafted) are in line with the approaches that we have 
already indicated that are supported by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. 
Human rights must be the foundation of progress towards a more just, democratic and 
equitable international community that can take on the challenges of peace, security, 
sustainable development and respect for rights from the pillars already established in the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
 
Precisely, the great challenge of building the right to peace requires, in my 
opinion, to insist, as Cançado Trindade underlines (2010, 360), in the lack of 
examination of the bases for peace within each State and the role of non-state entities. 
Certainly, I suggest that there is a need to achieve social justice within and between 
nations, an "urgent need to put an end to the tendency to separate economic 
development from social development, macro-economic policies from the social 
objectives of development". Likewise, it is essential to value and promote the growth 
and consolidation of international jurisdictions, as well as the conferences and forums 
promoted by the United Nations. Precisely, one of the outstanding issues to strengthen 
the Declaration as a reference instrument and, above all, to guarantee the human rights 
recognized by it, is that of a further consolidation of the International Criminal Court, 
deepened in issues, such as the number of States that have ratified its Statute, and also 
the relevance of the fact that some of those who have the right to veto in the Security 
Council have not done so. In the same way, it would be interesting to debate the role 
assigned to individuals before said Court and the type of crimes (hitherto genocide, war 
and against humanity, but not, for example, terrorism) in case it would be possible to 
include some of the ones that are not contemplated right now. 
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From the moral dimension, as a model of reference in the field of Human Rights, 
the Declaration is called to continue to play a relevant role. At a time like the current 
one, where it is no longer possible to deny the impetus of international human rights 
law, it is important to avoid what Habermas (2010, 120) calls a "soft deflation of human 
rights". It is a matter of avoiding a minimalism that separates human rights from their 
essential moral impulse, which is none other than the protection of the equal human 
dignity of each one. It is necessary to avoid the perspective that reduces the issue of 
human rights to matters strictly of international politics, in such a way that it obviates 
the relationship of tension within the State between universal human rights and rights of 
the individual citizen. This political vision is essential, as is also the legal one that 
erroneously strengthens the separation (and therefore exclusion) through criteria such as 
nationality and citizenship (as we pointed out with regard to freedom of movement and 
the right of asylum). 
 
The moral basis of human rights, clearly since the UDHR, assumes that each 
one, as a subject of the same rights, is respected as of their human dignity. The aim is to 
strengthen this "new ethos of our times" (Cançado Trindade (2010, 622) that human 
rights constitute, based on the momentum created by the Declaration and the 
progressive development of international instruments. The UDHR cannot be considered 
an outdated or exceeded text; on the contrary, it was an instrument of transformation 
and it remains, in its 70th anniversary, an engine for the always unfinished struggle for 
rights. 
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